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resolve the case at hand. In Sibbach v.
Wilson, 312 U.S. 1 (1941), the Court
"observed that federal courts, in adopting rules were not free to extend or
restrict the jurisdiction conferred by a
statute." Willy, 112 S. Ct. at 1079.
Federal courts, therefore, cannot adopt
rules which modify the judicial power
granted by Article III of the United
States Constitution.
Willy argued that the district court
had overreached the judicial power
granted by Article III by imposing
Rule 11 sanctions in a case absent
subject matter jurisdiction. ''Thus,
according to petitioner, even had Congress attempted to grant the courts
authority to impose sanctions in a case
such as this, the grant would run afoul
of Article IlL" Willy, 112 S. Ct. at
1079. Willy conceded that there are
circumstances in which federal courts
without subject matterjurisdiction may
impose sanctions. Nevertheless, he
contended that federal courts may not
take such action "against a party who
has successfully contestedjurisdiction."
Id. at 1079. The Court, however, reasoned that "in acknowledging the many
circumstances in which sanctions can
be imposed, several which have a statutory basis, petitioner effectively concedes both Congress' general power to
regulate the courts and its specific
power to authorize the imposition of
sanctions." Id. at 1080.
The Court stated that a federal court
found lacking subject matter jurisdiction would be precluded from further
adjudication of the case; ''but such a
determination does not automatically
wipe out all proceedings had in the
district court at a time when the district
court operated under the misapprehension that it hadjurisdiction." Id. After
reviewing other cases, the Court declared that in the interest of maintaining orderly procedure, sanctions should
be upheld despite a later determination
that the federal court was without jurisdiction. Id. Furthermore, Rule 11
sanctions were of collateral concern
and such sanctions were not an assessment of the legal merits of a case. Id.

Relying on Cooter & Gellv. Hartmarx the investigators in the criminal matCorp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990), the Court ter. In Rubin v. State, 602 A.2d 677
state that "it is well established that a (Md. 1992), the court of appeals held a
federal court may consider collateral private investigator's testimony about
issues after an action is no longer pend- statements made by the defendant being." Willy, 112 S. Ct. at 1080 (quot- fore her attorney arrived at the murder
ing Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. 384).
scene did not violate attorney-client
Willy supported his claim by citing privilege. However, the court found
United States Catholic Conference v. that the investigator's testimony conAbortion Rights Mobilization. Inc., 487 cerning events occurring later violated
U.S. 72 (1988), in which the Court her attorney-client privilege, but was
concluded that if on remand, the dis- harmless error. The court, although
trict court is found to be deficient in not explicitly doing so, appeared to
subject matter jurisdiction, the con- adopt an exception to the attorneytempt orders enacted by the district client privilege for evidence removed
court must collapse. Willy, 112 S. Ct. or altered by defense counsel.
at 1089. Based on this decision, Willy
Lisa Rubin and Timothy Warner's
asserted that Rule 11 sanctions im- 1O-year marriage was turbulent. It was
posed by a district court without sub- marked by numerous affairs and the
ject matter jurisdiction must fall. The alleged attempted murder of Rubin's
Court rejected Willy's liberal applica- ex-lover. In March 1990, Warner
tion of Catholic Conference the and moved out ofthe couple's home. Sevemphasized the differences in the pur- eral days later, Rubin engaged the serpose ofacivil contempt order and Rule vices of Prudential Associates, Inc., a
11 sanctions.
private investigating agency, to prove
Since Rule 11 sanctions do not in- that Warner was committing adultery.
volve the merits of a "case or contro- During the course of the investigation,
versy," a federal court without subject Rubin developed a close relationship
matter jurisdiction over a case may with Robert Miller, Prudential's presiconstitutionally impose procedural dent, and told Miller that Warner had
rules which are collateral to the case at admitted to her that he had tried to kill
hand. Accordingly, parties must ob- her former lover. Millerrecommended
serve procedural rules, such as Rule that Rubin consult with Prudential's
11, when practicing before federal attorney, Darrel Longest, about a poscourts, whether or not they agree with sible accessoryship problem. Rubin
the jurisdiction of that court.
subsequently met with Longest and
retained him to represent her.
On April 23, 1990, Warner tele- Carol Nakhuda Cohen
phoned Rubin concerning their dog.
Rubin v. State: PROTECTION OF They agreed to meet at the
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVI- veterinarian's office the following
LEGE DOES NOT APPLY TO LO- evening. After meeting at a parking
CATION AND CONDITION OF lot, Rubin and Warner walked down a
TANGIBLE EVIDENCE RE- path through a wooded area. There,
MOVED OR ALTERED BY DE- Rubin shot Warner nine times with a
FENSE COUNSEL EVEN IF IT IM- .38 caliber pistol, reloading twice in
the process. Rubin then called Miller
PLICATES THE DEFENDANT.
In a six to one decision, the Court of and arranged to meet him, without
Appeals of Maryland held that state- telling him the purpose ofthe meeting.
ments made by a defendant in a crimi- Miller, along with an associate,
nal case to investigators she had hired Leopold, met Rubin and she subsein a related domestic matter were not quently led them to the murder site.
protected by attorney-client privilege Only after talking to Rubin and examuntil her attorney specifically retained ining the scene did Miller call attorney
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Longest. After Longest arrived, he
advised the investigators not to discuss
the events because they were working
as his agents on this matter. The following day, Leopold made a statement
to the police. As a result, a search
warrant was issued for the office of
Longest. The murder weapon was
found in the attorney's office along
with an envelope containing six .22
caliber bullets.
Rubin filed a motion to suppress all
communications between the investigators, the attorneys and herself on the
basis of attorney-client privilege. The
Circuit Court for Montgomery County
held that the attorney-client relationship did not arise with respect to
Warner's murder until Longest arrived
at the scene. Rubin, 602 A.2d at 683.
Later, during the trial, Leopold testified that after meeting with Longest,
he had observed some .22 caliber bullets in Rubin's handbag. This testimony discredited Rubin's self-defense
theory that Warner had pulled a .22
pistol on her. Id. at 690. Rubin was
convicted and appealed. The court of
appeals issued a writ ofcertiorari on its
own motion prior to consideration by
the court of special appeals.
The first issue concerned when the
attorney-client privilege arose. The
court began by describing privileged
communications as those "made during the existence of actual relation of
attorney and client, or during interviews directed thereto, and must relate
to the subject-matter about which advice is sought." Id. at 684 (citing
Harrison v. State, 345 A.2d 202
(1970». The court then recognized
that the scope of the attorney-client
privilege may properly apply to communications between Rubin and the
Prudential investigators. Rubin, 603
A.2d at 683.
Rubin contended that legal representation by Longest embraced all aspects ofthe relationship between Rubin
and Warner and that she called Miller
to "get in touch with Mr. Longest." Id.
The court held that in applying the
existing law to the facts, the circuit
30 - The Law ForumJ22.3

court was warranted in finding that
Rubin did not have a reasonable expectation that her conversations with the
investigators would be protected by
attorney-client privilege, since neither
an employer-employee relationship,
nor an agency relationship existed between Longest and Prudential prior to
Longest's arrival at the murder scene.
Id. at 684.
The court next addressed Rubin's
contention that allowing Leopold to
testify about the bullets he saw in
Rubin's handbag, after the attorneyclient relationship attached, was error.
The court stated the general rule that
when the client is the source ofphysical evidence delivered by defensecounsel to the prosecution, the source will
not be disclosed to the jury. Id. at 689.
In allowing the testimony, the circuit
court relied on People v. Meredith, 631
P.2d 46 (Cal. 1981). In Meredith, the
California court held that "whenever
defense counsel removes or alters evidence, the [attorney-client] privilege
does not bar the revelation ofthe original location or condition of the evidence in question," Rubin, 602 A.2d at
686 (quoting Meredith, 631 P.2d at
54), even ifthe original location implicates the accused as the source.
The Meredith exception has been
held applicable when the defense moves
tangible evidence from a fixed location
or alters its condition. The rationale
behind the exception is that by removing or altering the evidence, defense
counsel "deprives the prosecution of
the opportunity to observe that evidence in its original condition or location." Id. (citing Meredith, 631 P.2dat
53). In analyzing the Meredith exception, the court first cited a litany of
cases supporting the general rule that a
defense attorney must turn over any
tangible evidence to the prosecution.
Rubin, 602 A.2d at 686-87. The court
then stated that when the attorney's
possession ofthe evidence was a result
of a client's "intentionally communicativeact or accompanied by, orresulting from, a confidential communication, the attorney-client privilege is

implicated." Id. at 687-88. Thus, at
trial, the original location and condition of evidence may be disclosed by
the prosecution, but the source of the
evidence, the communication from the
client, may not.
Previously, the Meredith exception
had only been applied to removal of
tangible evidence from a fixed location
by the defense team based on communication from the client. Id. at 689. In
the case sub judice, the State attempted
to classify moving the .22 caliber bullets from Rubin's handbag to the
attorney's file cabinet as a Meredith
alteration. Without specifically adopting or rejecting Meredith, the court of
appeals explained that the removal of
the bullets from the handbag was not
an alteration of "location" in the sense
of Meredith, but a separation of ''the
link between the physical evidence in
the possession of defense counsel and
the client source of that evidence," in
line with the general rule. Id. The
court found a violation of attorneyclient privilege, but ultimately considered itto be harmless error, because the
remaining evidence in the case could
not give rise to reasonable doubt.
Although the court ofappeals found
a violation of the protection of attorney-client privilege, this case is significant for the limitations that the
court imposes on that protection. First,
the court narrowly interpreted when
the attorney-client relation arises. In
the future, defendants will have to be
more careful in discussing events with
non-attorneys. Second, although the
court of appeals expanded the scope of
attorney-client privilege to evidence
obtained from defense counsel, who
obtained it based on client information, it also adopted an exception to
this protection. Attorneys in Maryland
will now have to make a tactical decision whether to remove and examine
tangible evidence and risk losing the
attorney-client privilege associated
with the location and condition ofthe
item or to leave the item in place and
protect observations.
-Ken Brown

